Aviation Security

On a spring day in March of 1999, while working on completing my schedule of assignments, I conducted a security screening checkpoint test at one of the larger screening checkpoints at Logan International Airport.  It was a typical test, done several times a week at airports throughout the country by Inspectors from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).  And, just as typically, the test was a failure.  Following standard testing protocol, I notified the contracted security company supervisor, then contacted the airlines checkpoint security supervisor, who then notified the station manager for the airline.  All promptly arrived to meet me in close proximity to the checkpoint. I explained the failed test scenario, which was followed by the typical excuses for this latest test failure.  The excuses given, usually in this order were; the screener is new; the screener hasn’t seen that test piece before; the screener was stressed; the screener was overly tired; the screener was, and this was always my favorite, “tricked by your testing method”.  I advised the station manager that the screener would need to be pulled from his screening position, retrained and retested, and that of course, the airline would get a letter of investigation, commonly referred to as an LOI.  This was the standard FAA failed test protocol, and this was the normal “corrective” action.  Played out over and over again for years and years, at every airport security screening checkpoint in the United States until September 11, 2001.

The station manager was clearly frustrated, and he had every right to be.  The airlines after all, paid the contracted security companies to perform on behalf of the airlines to conduct security screening in accordance with Federal Regulations, the airlines security programs and polices, and the checkpoint operation guide. Even if the contract was given usually to the lowest bidder, and that the security screening training provided by these contracted companies, often did not meet the most minimum FAA requirements, as documented in thousands of the now classified FAA reports. The station manager then turned to me and said, “I wish the Federal Government would take over security screening”! I, with all my glorious arrogant FAA Inspector demeanor, looked directly in his eyes, and replied “The Government will never take over security screening because it would be too expensive, and unmanageable given the size of the aviation system in the United States”.  So much for my ability to understand how greed and unscrupulousness, fueled by fear and ignorance in the wake of September 11, 2001, provide opportunities for those ready and willing to take advantage.  Thus was born, the Transportation Security Administration.

After 10 years of TSA operations, it is clear to almost everyone that the TSA was not created to protect the travelling public from another terrorist attack.  The TSA was created to protect the financial interests of the airline industry, and to create a lot of public sector jobs, and they have been especially effective in both sectors.


  In addition, the TSA has become a “second retirement income” for former Secret Service personal.  A post retirement slot in TSA leadership is the hottest ticket around for the former SS agency employees, this is especially true for the Federal Air Marshal (FAM) program.