|If any One finds err or wishes to Add any thing Please feel free to email me!
This Posts is for research for those seeking use of Pro Se Legal Action , for matters in the States of Indiana
Holding Libel Officials of the States or Officers of the The State.
Signing Legal work Pro Se
Notice: The respondent in this action is a non-lawyer and is moving forward in propia persona. Hanes v. Kerner (92 S Ct 594) pro se pleadings are to be considered without regard to technicality; prose litigants" pleadings are not to be held to the same high standards of perfection as lawyers. Jenkins v. McKeithen (456 US 411 421 (1969); Picking v. Penna Ry. Co (151 Fed 2nd 240); Pucket v. Cox (456 Fed 2nd 233); Haines v. Kerner, et.al. (429 F. 2d 71 (1972)); Conley v. Gibson (355 US 41, 45-6 (1957)); Dioguardi v. During (139 F. 2d 774 (1948))
You can recover Lawyer fees filing pro se
The specific case you want is
Pickholtz v. Rainbow Technologies,
284 F. 3rd 1365 (2002). You can
google that and get several
citations. One address is
For a broad overview "cases and
materials on pro se litigation and
Filing free , in relation to views of forma pauperis
Article 1 Section 12
Section 12. Openess of the courts, Speedy trial
Section 12. All courts shall be open; and every person, for injury done to him in his person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law. Justice shall be administered freely, and without purchase; completely, and without denial; speedily, and without delay.
(History: As Amended November 6, 1984).
Officers; judges; prosecuting attorney; liability to impeachment in Like ness of Enforcement Act of 1871 (third act) cited in relation to Pro Se filings use of the 1st Amendment rights of redress , not limited to the 7th Amendment & Amendment 14 Section 3 , when 2 or more Officals of the state are Libel in court for seeking to conspire to deprive Civil Rights , Constructive Treason , http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constructive_treason
Articles 2 Section 4
The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors
Article 2 section 1
In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death, resignation or inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what officer shall then act as President, and such officer shall act accordingly, until the disability be removed, or a President shall be elected
U.S. Constitution - Article 1 Section 9
No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed
U.S. Constitution - Article 1 Section 10
Article 1 - The Legislative Branch
Section 10 - Powers Prohibited of States
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No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress.
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any state, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any state legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any state, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.
Doing it your self
I have found in seeking to file counter claim for violations of rights by the courts the use of prosecutorial immunity , qualified immunity amounted to a sua sponte summary judgment.”). rather then letting the use rights of redress , If and when this happens you can seek to file impeachment legal actions in some cases in light of the 14th Amendment Section 3 to seek to hold In ethics and governance, accountability.
Section 1. Inherent rights
Section 1. WE DECLARE, That all people are created equal; that they are endowed by their CREATOR with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that all power is inherent in the People; and that all free governments are, and of right ought to be, founded on their authority, and instituted for their peace, safety, and well-being. For the advancement of these ends, the People have, at all times, an indefeasible right to alter and reform their government.
(History: As Amended November 6, 1984).
Section 20. Civil cases--Right of trial by jury
Section 20. In all civil cases, the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.
Section 23. Equal privileges and immunities
Section 23. The General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.
Section 24. Ex post facto laws
Section 24. No ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall ever be passed.
Section 26. Suspension of laws
Section 26. The operation of the laws shall never be suspended, except by the authority of the General Assembly.
Section 27. Habeas corpus
Section 27. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, except in case of rebellion or invasion; and then, only if the public safety demand it.
Section 28. Treason defined
Section 28. Treason against the State shall consist only in levying war against it, and in giving aid and comfort to its enemies.
Section 29. Treason, proof
Section 29. No person shall be convicted of treason, except on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or upon his confession in open court.
Section 30. Effect of conviction
Section 30. No conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate.
Section 31. Right of assemblage and petition
Section 31. No law shall restrain any of the inhabitants of the State from assembling together in a peaceable manner, to consult for their common good; nor from instructing their representatives; nor from applying to the General Assembly for redress of grievances.
Section 35. Titles of nobility
Section 35. The General Assembly shall not grant any title of nobility, nor confer hereditary distinctions ,
Note I have found from research For the State government to pass to remove the right of redress by citing The Judge as a Judge as Title is in confliction with immunities views, like if one seeks to file a claim in court for you think the Judge has Been in Violation of your rights in views of constructive treason , To claim You can't File can't been Done not completely You have the right to seek redress via impeachment. and this is partly why I am posting this , thus from research for the use of things like when signing Acts Pro Se and the use of
A (writ of) mandamus or Quo warranto , http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/mandamus , http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quo_warranto
Fighting back on summary judgments many time the courts will just give a Bench like trial Action, this is Case law Citing. such points
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CITY OF SANTA CRUZ; CHRISTOPHER
KROHN, individually and in his
official capacity as Mayor of the No. 07-15814
City of Santa Cruz; TIM
FITZMAURICE; KEITH A. SUGAR; EMILY
REILLY; ED PORTER; SCOTT KENNEDY;
MARK PRIMACK, individually and in
their official capacities as Members OPINION
of the Santa Cruz City Council;
LORAN BAKER, individually and in
his official capacity as Sergeant of
the Santa Cruz Police Department;
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Ronald M. Whyte, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted
June 22, 2010—Pasadena, California
Filed December 15, 2010
Before: Alex Kozinski, Chief Judge, Stephen Reinhardt,
Pamela Ann Rymer, Sidney R. Thomas,
M. Margaret McKeown, William A. Fletcher,
Raymond C. Fisher, Ronald M. Gould, Richard C. Tallman,
Richard R. Clifton and Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.
Case: 07-15814 12/15/2010 Page: 1 of 22 ID: 7580981 DktEntry: 50-1Opinion by Judge Thomas;
Concurrence by Chief Judge Kozinski
20068 NORSE v. SANTA CRUZ
Case: 07-15814 12/15/2010 Page: 2 of 22 ID: 7580981 DktEntry: 50-1COUNSEL
David J. Beauvais, Oakland, California; and Kate Wells, Law
Office of Kate Wells, Santa Cruz, California, for plaintiffappellant Robert Norse.
George J. Kavacevich, Atchison, Barisone & Condotti, Santa
Cruz, California, for defendants-appellees City of Santa Cruz
NORSE v. SANTA CRUZ 20071
Case: 07-15814 12/15/2010 Page: 3 of 22 ID: 7580981 DktEntry: 50-1OPINION
THOMAS, Circuit Judge:
When Robert Norse gave the Santa Cruz City Council a
silent Nazi salute, he was ejected and arrested. He sued city
officials for violating his rights under the First Amendment.
On the eve of trial, the district court sua sponte granted judgment against him, holding that the city officials were entitled
to qualified immunity. Because the district court failed to provide Norse adequate notice and opportunity to be heard,
among other procedural errors, we reverse the judgment of the
On March 12, 2002, Robert Norse was ejected from a Santa
Cruz City Council (“City Council”) meeting and arrested after
an incident in which he gave the Council a silent Nazi salute.
Two weeks later, he filed a complaint in the District Court of
Northern California, challenging the constitutionality of the
City Council’s decorum policy on its face and as applied to
his conduct at the 2002 meeting. He named as defendants the
City of Santa Cruz; Christopher Krohn, the Mayor (“Mayor”);
Tim Fitzmaurice and Scott Kennedy, members of the Santa
Cruz City Council; Loran Baker, the sergeant-at-arms of the
meeting (and also a member of the Santa Cruz police force);
and several others (collectively “the City”).
The district court granted the City’s motion to dismiss.
Norse appealed. A panel of this court affirmed dismissal of
Norse’s facial challenge, but reversed dismissal of the asapplied challenge. Norse v. City of Santa Cruz (“Norse I”),
118 Fed. App’x. 177 (9th Cir. 2004). Construing the City’s
rules to proscribe only disruptive conduct, the panel held the
rules were facially valid under controlling circuit case law.
See id. at 178 (citing White v. City of Norwalk, 900 F.2d 1421
(9th Cir. 1990)). The panel was not able to determine from the
20072 NORSE v. SANTA CRUZ
Case: 07-15814 12/15/2010 Page: 4 of 22 ID: 7580981 DktEntry: 50-1pleadings whether the Nazi salute was disruptive, however,
and thus had “no way of assessing the reasonableness of the
Mayor’s conclusion that Norse should have been ejected.” Id.
It reversed and remanded the as-applied challenge.
On January 13, 2004, while his appeal was pending before
this Circuit, Norse again was ejected from another Santa Cruz
City Council meeting and arrested, this time for whispering to
another meeting attendee. On remand, Norse amended his
complaint to challenge this ejection, as well. In June 2005, the
district court entered a case management order giving the parties just less than six months to conduct limited discovery,
and requiring that all dispositive motions be heard no later
than December 16, 2005.
Neither party filed any dispositive motions.
court scheduled a jury trial for March 26, 2007. The parties
filed trial briefs, motions in limine, evidentiary objections,
proposed voir dire questions and jury instructions, and otherwise prepared for trial. In one motion in limine, Norse
objected to the City’s efforts to introduce evidence of his participation in City Council meetings other than the 2002 and
2004 meetings discussed in the complaint. At a pretrial hearing on March 15, Norse also objected to the admissibility of
meeting minutes that purported to describe his conduct at
On Thursday, March 22, 2007, the district court issued an
order regarding trial proceedings in which it stated that rather
than hold trial on the 26th, it would “consider the question of
whether any of the individual defendants . . . is entitled to
qualified immunity.” The order also indicated the court was
likely to deny, in part, Norse’s motion in limine to exclude
At oral argument before the district court, the City indicated its decision not to file a motion for summary judgment was a tactical choice. The
district court noted at the commencement of the hearing that “it would
have been helpful if there had been a summary judgment motion.”
NORSE v. SANTA CRUZ 20073
Case: 07-15814 12/15/2010 Page: 5 of 22 ID: 7580981 DktEntry: 50-1evidence of his actions at other City Council meetings, but
stated that it would consider the specific evidence that the
City wished to have admitted and would make evidentiary
rulings on the 26th as well.
That Monday, Norse and the City appeared for a hearing.
Norse objected to what he saw as an unorthodox procedure,
arguing that he had been preparing for trial and did not have
time to produce what in effect needed to be an opposition to
summary judgment. He argued that videotapes of the 2002
and 2004 meetings were not accurate portrayals of the meetings inasmuch as they were only excerpts. He continued to
object to the admissibility of evidence regarding other City
Council meetings. He argued that he had witnesses to call
who could give context to the videos. He opposed qualified
immunity on the merits. The district court did not permit
Norse to submit further evidence or present testimony.
On March 28, the district court entered a summary judgment order. See LaLonde v. Cnty. of Riverside, 204 F.3d 947,
953 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The court’s pretrial order granting qualified immunity amounted to a sua sponte summary judgment.”). It determined that the individual defendants were
entitled to qualified immunity and that there was no independent basis to hold Santa Cruz liable. Although the district
court appeared to consider evidence of Norse’s conduct at two
2001 City Council meetings, it did not rule on Norse’s motion
in limine, nor did it resolve all pending evidentiary questions.
Norse appealed. The original panel retained jurisdiction
over the case, and it affirmed. Norse v. City of Santa Cruz
(“Norse II”), 586 F.3d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 2009). This time,
Judge Tashima, dissenting in part, argued that “the record
supports the inference that the Mayor and members of the
City Council excluded Norse from the 2002 meeting because
they disagreed with the views he expressed by giving his
silent Nazi salute.” Id. at 701 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
20074 NORSE v. SANTA CRUZ
Case: 07-15814 12/15/2010 Page: 6 of 22 ID: 7580981 DktEntry: 50-1A majority of nonrecused active judges voted to rehear this
case en banc pursuant to Circuit Rule 35-3. After reviewing
the case, we conclude that the procedure the district court
used in summarily disposing of Norse’s claims was deficient
and unfair to Norse.
District courts unquestionably possess the power to enter
summary judgment sua sponte, even on the eve of trial.
However, the procedural rules governing Rule 56 apply regardless
of whether the district court is acting in response to a party’s
motion, or sua sponte. See Routman v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 873 F.2d 970, 971 (6th Cir. 1989); Ind. Port
Comm’n, 702 F.2d at 111. Here, the district court erred in
granting summary judgment sua sponte without providing
Norse adequate notice and opportunity to be heard and without ruling on Norse’s evidentiary objections.
 “Sua sponte grants of summary judgment are only
appropriate if the losing party has reasonable notice that the
sufficiency of his or her claim will be in issue.” United States
v. 14.02 Acres of Land More or Less in Fresno Cnty., 547
F.3d 943, 955 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Reasonable notice implies adequate time to develop the
facts on which the litigant will depend to oppose summary
judgment.” Portsmouth Square, Inc. v. S’holders Protective
Comm., 770 F.2d 866, 869 (9th Cir. 1985).
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 326 (1986). While the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure have not expressly granted district courts this
power, it nonetheless derives from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.
Ind. Port Comm’n v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 702 F.2d 107, 111 (7th Cir.
1983). Effective December 1, 2010, Rule 56 will make the power explicit.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) (explaining that the district court may grant summary judgment “for a nonmovant,” “on grounds not raised by a party,” or
“on its own”).
NORSE v. SANTA CRUZ 20075
Case: 07-15814 12/15/2010 Page: 7 of 22 ID: 7580981 DktEntry: 50-1 A district court that “does not comply with the advance
notice and response provisions of Rule 56(c) has no power to
enter summary judgment.” Ind. Port Comm’n, 702 F.2d at
111. At the time the district court acted, Rule 56 required that
summary judgment motions “be served at least 10 days before
the day set for the hearing,” even when the court was acting
sua sponte. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (1987);
see Routman, 873
F.2d at 971.
 In this case, the district-court-imposed deadline for filing dispositive motions had passed some fifteen months
before trial. On the Thursday before the Monday trial, the district court notified the parties of its intent to hear summary
judgment arguments on the day set for trial. Under the rules
operative at the time, Norse was only afforded two-days’
notice before the hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(2) (1985
amendments) (weekend days excluded from calculation).
Two-days’ notice did not comply with the requirements of
Rule 56, and it did not afford Norse adequate time to prepare
for the hearing, notwithstanding the proximity of the trial
date. See Stella, 4 F.3d at 55 (“[T]rial preparation is neither
the same as, nor an acceptable substitute for, the special sort
The local rules for the Northern District of California in effect at that
time were more stringent, requiring summary judgment motions to be
served at least 35 days before the hearing date (although allowing district
courts discretion to hear motions filed in accordance with the timeline in
the Federal rules). See Local Rule 7-2(a) (March 2007), 56-1.
See also Gibson v. Mayor & Council of Wilmington, 355 F.3d 215,
223 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that the 10 day notice requirement in thenRule 56 governs sua sponte grants of summary judgment); Stella v. Town
of Tewksbury, Mass., 4 F.3d 53, 55 (1st Cir. 1993) (same); FernandezMontes v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 987 F.2d 278, 283 n.7 (5th Cir. 1993)
(same); Capuano v. United States, 955 F.2d 1427, 1432 n.16 (11th Cir.
1992) (same); Scottish Air Int’l, Inc. v. British Caledonian Grp., PLC, 945
F.2d 53, 55 (2d Cir. 1991) (same); U.S. Dev. Corp. v. Peoples Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass’n, 873 F.2d 731, 735 (4th Cir. 1989); cf. Resolution Trust
Corp. v. Ruggiero, 994 F.2d 1221, 1226 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding more
generally that the conditions of Rule 56 must be satisfied).
20076 NORSE v. SANTA CRUZ
Case: 07-15814 12/15/2010 Page: 8 of 22 ID: 7580981 DktEntry: 50-1of preparation, e.g., securing affidavits, needed to oppose a
motion for summary judgment.”).
 Because adequate notice was not given within the
period specified by the rules, the district court was without
power to enter summary judgment sua sponte.
 Additionally, Norse did not have a “full and fair opportunity to ventilate the issues prior to the district court’s summary judgment on the [his] claims.” Greene v. Solano Cnty.
Jail, 513 F.3d 982, 990 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation
Norse told the district court that he wanted to call attendees
of the Council meetings as witnesses to testify about whether
Norse actually disrupted them. In particular, Norse wanted to
present testimony about whether the 2004 whisper was audible. And he wanted to present evidence that other people acting similarly to him were not ejected from the 2004 meeting.
He explained that he had not been able to prepare deposition
testimony or otherwise create a record in time for the hearing
but was prepared to call witnesses at trial concerning these
 The district court rejected Norse’s requests and did not
5We are mindful that the 10-day requirement specified in Rule 56 will
be removed in December 2010. The revised rule does not establish a specific time requirement unless “set by local rule . . . or court order[ ],” but
it requires a district court contemplating sua sponte judgment to provide
“notice and a reasonable time to respond.” We need not decide what effect
the court’s order or the Northern District local rules would have in the
absence of a specific national rule. Nor do we need to decide whether the
notice would have been “reasonable” under the revised rule. In all cases,
however, district courts should exercise special care in providing notice
when contemplating granting summary judgment sua sponte on the eve of
trial after the dispositive motion deadline has passed.
NORSE v. SANTA CRUZ 20077
Case: 07-15814 12/15/2010 Page: 9 of 22 ID: 7580981 DktEntry: 50-1permit him the time to compile evidence for the court. Norse
received neither the 10-days notice nor a full and fair opportunity to ventilate the issues, so we must reverse the district
court’s grant of summary judgment. See United States v.
Grayson, 879 F.2d 620, 625 (9th Cir. 1989).
 Before ordering summary judgment in a case, a district
court must not only provide the parties with notice and an
opportunity to respond to adverse arguments, it must also rule
on evidentiary objections that are material to its ruling. See
Sanchez v. Aerovias De Mexico, S.A. De C.V., 590 F.3d 1027,
1029 (9th Cir. 2010) (acknowledging this rule, but noting it
is subject to harmless error analysis). In this case, the district
court failed to rule on Norse’s evidentiary objections material
to its ruling.
Rule 56 requires the parties to set out facts they will be able
to prove at trial. While the evidence presented at the summary
judgment stage does not yet need to be in a form that would
be admissible at trial, the proponent must set out facts that it
will be able to prove through admissible evidence. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(e) (“A supporting or opposing affidavit must be
made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be
admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant is competent
to testify on the matters stated.”); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at
324. This requirement is no less applicable where the district
court’s summary judgment is granted sua sponte.
Norse had stated three relevant evidentiary objections.
First, he filed a motion in limine, seeking to exclude all evidence related to all incidents involving him at city council
meetings—other than the 2002 and 2004 meetings—as irrelevant, prejudicial, and improper character evidence. Second, he
objected to the City’s attempt to introduce evidence of some
of these incidents via written minutes as double hearsay. And
third, he objected that the videos did not accurately portray
20078 NORSE v. SANTA CRUZ
Case: 07-15814 12/15/2010 Page: 10 of 22 ID: 7580981 DktEntry: 50-1the meetings because they were only excerpts. The district
court failed to issue a final ruling on any of these objections.
In fact, the court considered video evidence not only of the
2002 and 2004 meetings but also of what happened at other
 The district court’s failure to rule on Norse’s evidentiary objections contributed to a greater problem that we face
in this case, which is that we do not know what evidence to
consider on appeal. The parties did not file any affidavits,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, or any other material
after the district court scheduled the qualified immunity hearing. We know from the minutes of the pretrial hearing and the
qualified immunity hearing that the City gave the district
court two DVDs that contained different video recordings of
the 2002 and 2004 meetings, as well as excerpts from untold
other meetings, and copies of the City Council Rules of Decorum in effect during the 2002 and 2004 meetings. But it is
also clear that the district court did not decide which portions
of the DVDs were admissible, leaving that question for later
resolution. The parties were (and continue to be) confused on
precisely what constitutes the actual record and dispute what
evidence we should actually consider. Because the record on
appeal is inadequate, we are unable to engage in meaningful
appellate review. See Dikeman v. Nat’l Educators, Inc., 81
F.3d 949, 954 (10th Cir. 1996) (concluding that court of
appeals is unable to review an issue if the record is not adequate); Hill v. City of New York, 45 F.3d 653, 663 (2d Cir.
1995) (remanding issue of qualified immunity when appellate
record was inadequate to assess the defense).
The district court stated that the parties agreed that the videotapes “depict what occurred at the meetings.” But Norse’s objection was that they
were incomplete, and therefore did not accurately depict what occurred at
the meetings. Whether or not this objection had merit as an evidentiary
matter, the district court was required to rule on it.
NORSE v. SANTA CRUZ 20079
Case: 07-15814 12/15/2010 Page: 11 of 22 ID: 7580981 DktEntry: 50-1D
Most procedural Rule 56 errors are subject to harmlesserror analysis. See, e.g., Kistner v. Califano, 579 F.2d 1004,
1006 (6th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (discussing timing of notice
and noting that the error is waivable). The error here is not
harmless, though, because we do not know what evidence
Norse would have presented if he had been afforded adequate
notice and opportunity to present his case. As we do not know
what admissible evidence forms the record, we cannot conduct an independent review of the record to see whether genuine issues of material fact exist.
 The district court apparently relied on the videos of the
council that were submitted to it as a basis for its decision.
However, there are genuine issues of material fact apparent
from the recordings, which would entitle Norse to a trial on
A mayor’s entitlement to qualified immunity for
ejecting a person from a city council meeting “depends on
whether a reasonable person in his position, acting on his
information and motivated by his purpose, would have known
that ejecting [the attendee] violated his clearly established
rights.” Hansen v. Bennett, 948 F.2d 397, 400 (7th Cir. 1991)
(emphasis added); see also Monteiro v. City of Elizabeth, 436
F.3d 397, 404 (3d Cir. 2006) (“In cases in which a constitutional violation depends on evidence of a specific intent, it
can never be objectively reasonable for a government official
to act with the intent that is prohibited by law.” (internal quo-
In its order directing the parties to appear to argue qualified immunity,
the court stated that: “In this case, there are video tapes of the incidents
in question and both parties have agreed that they are admissible and presumably agree they accurately depict what occurred. Therefore, the facts
As indicated earlier, we are uncertain as to what portions of the DVDs
the court considered in making its ruling. For the purposes of this discussion, we assume that some portions of the DVDs submitted to us contained the same footage of the two council meetings as viewed by the
20080 NORSE v. SANTA CRUZ
Case: 07-15814 12/15/2010 Page: 12 of 22 ID: 7580981 DktEntry: 50-1tation marks omitted)). The DVDs show triable issues of fact
as to whether Norse was impermissibly ejected because of his
viewpoint rather than his alleged disruptiveness.
As the Seventh Circuit wrote in a very similar case,
[T]he defendants argue that their appeal cannot present a factual question because the record includes a
tape recording and transcript of the city council
meeting. As a result, the parties do not disagree
about what [the attendee] said or did, what [the
Mayor] said or did, or what generally transpired at
the meeting. Be that as it may, the record does not
enable us to determine the factual issue of [the
Mayor]’s intent; we would need a transcript of his
thoughts for that. In so holding, we are mindful that
“[s]ummary judgment is not defeated merely
because issues of motive or intent are involved.”
Jackson v. Elrod, 881 F.2d [441,] 443 [(7th Cir.
1989)]. We do not hold that [the Mayor]’s intent is
metaphysically unknowable, but that there is a genuine factual dispute on the question.
Hansen, 948 F.2d at 400 (fifth alteration in Hansen).
 Of course, different viewers of the tape may draw different conclusions, and that is precisely why summary judgment was inappropriate here—at the summary judgment
stage, the non-moving party is entitled to have permissible
inferences drawn in his or her favor. Here, applying our traditional summary judgment analysis, we conclude there are
genuine issues of material fact present on the video that preclude summary judgment.
9We do recognize that the proximity of trial may have led the district
court to believe that summary judgment rules did not apply, and we are
aware that the Supreme Court has “repeatedly . . . stressed the importance
of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.”
NORSE v. SANTA CRUZ 20081
Case: 07-15814 12/15/2010 Page: 13 of 22 ID: 7580981 DktEntry: 50-1III
The City argues, in the alternative, that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, either on the pleadings or based on
other undisputed facts. We may, of course, affirm the district
court on any basis supported by the record. However, we must
reject the City’s arguments, except as to one defendant.
The City contends that only certain portions of its meetings
are limited public forums and that no members of the public
have any First Amendment rights at all once the public comment period has concluded. The City cites no support for this
proposition, and there is none.
 In City of Norwalk, we held that city council meetings, once open to public participation, are limited public
forums. 900 F.2d at 1425. A council can regulate not only the
time, place, and manner of speech in a limited public forum,
but also the content of speech—as long as content-based regulations are viewpoint neutral and enforced that way. Id.; see
also Kindt v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 67 F.3d 266,
270-71 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[L]imitations on speech at [city
council] meetings must be reasonable and viewpoint neutral
. . . .”); accord Steinburg v. Chesterfield Cnty. Planning
Comm’n, 527 F.3d 377, 385 (4th Cir. 2008); Eichenlaub v.
Twp. of Ind., 385 F.3d 274, 281 (3d Cir. 2004).
 What a city council may not do is, in effect, close an
open meeting by declaring that the public has no First
Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991). This opinion is not intended
to limit the times at which a district court might address the question of
qualified immunity, sua sponte or otherwise. But, whether the district
court is ruling before trial or after trial, it must carefully consider its role
in construing evidence and the applicable law, abide by the normal procedural requirements associated with that stage of litigation, and ensure that
the parties have had a full and fair opportunity to be heard.
20082 NORSE v. SANTA CRUZ
Case: 07-15814 12/15/2010 Page: 14 of 22 ID: 7580981 DktEntry: 50-1Amendment right whatsoever once the public comment
period has closed. As we explained in Norwalk, the entire city
council meeting held in public is a limited public forum. But
the fact that a city may impose reasonable time limitations on
speech does not mean it can transform the nature of the forum
by doing so, much less extinguish all First Amendment rights.
A limited public forum is a limited public forum. Perhaps
nothing more, but certainly nothing less. The City’s theory
would turn the entire concept on its head.
 Thus, even though we can tell from the face of the
amended complaint that Norse’s provocative gesture was
made after the public comment period closed, Norse still had
a First Amendment right to be free from viewpoint discrimination at that time.
The City’s argument proves the danger of its theory. The
City contended at oral argument before us that, because the
public had no First Amendment rights after the public comment period had closed, the Council could legitimately eject
members of the public who made a “thumbs down” gesture,
but allow members of the public who made a “thumbs up”
gesture to remain.
10We note that we have been unable to find a single First Amendment
case where a person has the right to be in a place but has no First Amendment rights once there. Rather, the First Amendment test itself accounts
for the nature of the forum and, at its most restrictive, only permits viewpoint neutral restrictions that are “reasonable in light of the purpose served
by the forum.” See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98,
107 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry
Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983); see also Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 406 n.2 (2007) (“[S]tudent First Amendment rights are
applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822
(1974) (“[A] prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are
not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.”).
11When queried at oral argument whether that action would constitute
classic viewpoint discrimination, the City responded that it was “just
NORSE v. SANTA CRUZ 20083
Case: 07-15814 12/15/2010 Page: 15 of 22 ID: 7580981 DktEntry: 50-1We decline the City’s invitation to rewrite First Amendment law to extinguish the rights that citizens have when they
attend public meetings.
We also decline the City’s invitation to rewrite the rule
announced in Norwalk. 900 F.2d at 1424-26. There, we held
that a city’s “Rules of Decorum” are not facially over-broad
where they only permit a presiding officer to eject an attendee
for actually disturbing or impeding a meeting. Id.
In this case, the City argues that cities may define “disturbance” in any way they choose. Specifically, the City argues
that it has defined any violation of its decorum rules to be a
“disturbance.” Therefore, it reasons, Norwalk permits the City
to eject anyone for violation of the City’s rules—rules that
were only held to be facially valid to the extent that they
require a person actually to disturb a meeting before being
ejected. We must respectfully reject the City’s attempt to
engage us in doublespeak. Actual disruption means actual disruption. It does not mean constructive disruption, technical
disruption, virtual disruption, nunc pro tunc disruption, or
imaginary disruption. The City cannot define disruption so as
to include non-disruption to invoke the aid of Norwalk.
 The city officials are not entitled to absolute immunity. Local legislators are absolutely immune from liability
under § 1983 for their legislative acts. See Bogan v. ScottHarris, 523 U.S. 44, 49 (1998). But “not all governmental
acts by . . . a local legislature[ ] are necessarily legislative in
nature.” Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560,
580 (9th Cir. 1984). “Whether an act is legislative turns on the
nature of the act, rather than on the motive or intent of the
official performing it.” Bogan, 523 U.S. at 54. Thus, we must
determine whether the actions of the Council members, when
20084 NORSE v. SANTA CRUZ
Case: 07-15814 12/15/2010 Page: 16 of 22 ID: 7580981 DktEntry: 50-1“stripped of all considerations of intent and motive,” were
legislative rather than administrative or executive. Id. at 55.
 In this Circuit, we have developed a four-part test to
determine whether an action is legislative in nature. We consider “(1) whether the act involves ad hoc decisionmaking, or
the formulation of policy; (2) whether the act applies to a few
individuals, or to the public at large; (3) whether the act is formally legislative in character; and (4) whether it bears all the
hallmarks of traditional legislation.” Kaahumanu v. Cnty. of
Maui, 315 F.3d 1215, 1220 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “Whether an act is ad hoc can depend on
whether it is aimed at a few people or many, and whether an
act bears all the hallmarks of traditional legislation can
depend on whether it is ad hoc.” Id. at 1220 n.4.
 In this case, we are dealing with city officials who
ejected one individual from City Council meetings. Separately, and with regard to his argument for municipal liability,
Norse argues that the officials were formulating policy. We
need not determine whether the ejections “effectuate[d] policy,” however, see id. at 1220, because the second, third, and
fourth factors clearly point to this being an administrative
rather than legislative act. Thus, Krohn, Kennedy, and Fitzmaurice are not entitled to absolute immunity for their part in
removing Norse from the meetings. Although the record is
incomplete, it appears that in both 2002 and 2004 Norse was
singled out for expulsion and arrest. Mayors Krohn and Kennedy did not take any formal legislative action, but rather
ordered Norse out of the room. And both expulsions lacked
the hallmarks of the legislative process. With respect to the
2002 arrest, Krohn ordered Norse to leave on Fitzmaurice’s
motion without any debate. The motion was predicated on the
“dignity” of the council rather than the council’s performance
of its obligations to the citizens of Santa Cruz. See id. at 1223.
And with respect to the 2004 arrest, the record does not reveal
a motion based even on dignity, let alone a legislative decisionmaking process. Thus the decisions to expel Norse were
NORSE v. SANTA CRUZ 20085
Case: 07-15814 12/15/2010 Page: 17 of 22 ID: 7580981 DktEntry: 50-1administrative, not legislative, so the defendants are not entitled to absolute immunity. See Vacca v. Barletta, 933 F.2d 31
(1st Cir. 1991) (holding that the Chair of a school committee
was not absolutely immune from suit over his actions in
removing another committee member from a meeting).
 The district court dismissed the case against Santa
Cruz based on its determination that Norse’s constitutional
rights were not violated. The City urges us to affirm this dismissal on the basis that Norse failed to allege any facts that
could support municipal liability under Monell v. Department
of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Norse argues that
municipalities can be liable under § 1983 for single decisions
taken by municipal policymakers. But the question of whether
the two ejections constituted an act or acts of official government policy is a question of fact appropriately decided on a
more fully-developed record. The City is not entitled to summary judgment on this question.
As against officer Baker, Norse alleges claims of false
arrest and excessive force. The City argues that Baker is
immune from suit if reasonable officers in his position could
have disagreed on the issue of probable cause. We agree with
the City. The existence of probable cause is dispositive as to
false arrest and excessive force claims.
 “To prevail on [a] § 1983 claim for false arrest . . . [a
plaintiff must] demonstrate that there was no probable cause
to arrest him.” Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d
374, 380 (9th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). Moreover, a government official is entitled to qualified immunity on a false arrest
claim if a reasonable officer in his position could have
believed that probable cause existed. See Ramirez v. City of
Buena Park, 560 F.3d 1012, 1024 (9th Cir. 2009). While
20086 NORSE v. SANTA CRUZ
Case: 07-15814 12/15/2010 Page: 18 of 22 ID: 7580981 DktEntry: 50-1Norse alleges in his pleadings that there was no probable
cause to arrest him in 2002 or 2004, he nonetheless alleges
facts that could have led a reasonable officer to believe that
probable cause existed for his arrest. In both 2002 and 2004,
Norse actually spoke verbally, in violation of the Rules of
Decorum, in response to Council members’ attempts to eject
him from the Council chambers. Based on these facts, a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause
existed to arrest Norse for violation of California Penal Code
§ 403, disturbance of a public assembly or meeting. Therefore, Baker is entitled to judgment on the false-arrest claim.
Norse also alleges he was subject to excessive force. An
excessive-force claim that arises in the context of an arrest is
properly characterized as one invoking the protections of the
Fourth Amendment. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394
(1989). “To determine if a Fourth Amendment violation has
occurred, we must balance the extent of the intrusion on the
individual’s Fourth Amendment rights against the government’s interests to determine whether the officer’s conduct
was objectively reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances.” Espinosa v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 598 F.3d 528,
537 (9th Cir. 2010). The only force alleged in the complaint
was Baker’s order that Norse place his hands behind his back
at the 2002 meeting. Even though Norse was being arrested
for, at most, a minor misdemeanor offense, we cannot say that
a reasonable officer in Baker’s position would have known
that this limited use of force was unreasonable: Norse had
refused to leave the meeting of his own accord, a fact also
alleged in the complaint, and a reasonable officer could have
believed that probable cause existed for the arrest. Therefore,
judgment must be entered in favor of Baker on the claims
asserted against him.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the dismissal of
Norse’s § 1983 claim as to his First Amendment claims. We
NORSE v. SANTA CRUZ 20087
Case: 07-15814 12/15/2010 Page: 19 of 22 ID: 7580981 DktEntry: 50-1affirm the dismissal of Norse’s claims against Baker. We
remand with instructions for the district court to rule on
Norse’s pending motion in limine to exclude evidence of
Council meetings other than the 2002 and 2004 meetings
mentioned in his complaint, and to hold the trial that it had
originally scheduled for March 26, 2007. In accordance with
our precedent, the district court may entertain a post-trial
motion for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of qualified immunity after the facts are resolved at trial. Tortu v. Las
Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 556 F.3d 1075, 1083 (9th Cir.
We need not, and do not, reach any other issues urged by
the parties. Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART;
REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Chief Judge KOZINSKI, with whom Judge REINHARDT
I join Judge Thomas’s opinion because it’s clearly right. I
write only to observe that, even after the procedural irregularities that deprived Norse an opportunity to present evidence,
it’s clear that the council members aren’t entitled to qualified
immunity. In the Age of YouTube, there’s no need to take my
word for it: There is a video of the incident that I’m “happy
to allow . . . to speak for itself.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,
378 n.5 (2007); see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
ZOssHWB6WBI (last visited Nov. 16, 2010). This video
(also found in the record) clearly shows that Norse’s sieg heil
was momentary and casual, causing no disruption whatsoever.
It would have remained entirely unnoticed, had a city councilman not interrupted the proceedings to take umbrage and
insist that Norse be cast out of the meeting. Councilman Fitzmaurice clearly wants Norse expelled because the “Nazi
20088 NORSE v. SANTA CRUZ
Case: 07-15814 12/15/2010 Page: 20 of 22 ID: 7580981 DktEntry: 50-1salute” is “against the dignity of this body and the decorum
of this body” and not because of any disruption. But, unlike
der Führer, government officials in America occasionally
must tolerate offensive or irritating speech. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Duran v. City of Douglas, Ariz.,
904 F.2d 1372, 1378 (9th Cir. 1990).
The Supreme Court long ago explained that “in our system,
undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not
enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.” Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508
(1969). Even in a limited public forum like a city council
meeting, the First Amendment tightly constrains the government’s power; speakers may be removed only if they are actually disruptive.
We’ve said so twice. In White v. City of Norwalk, 900 F.2d
1421 (9th Cir. 1990), we explained that speech must “disrupt[,] disturb[ ] or otherwise impede[ ] the orderly conduct of
the Council meeting” before the speaker could be removed.
Id. at 1426. And in Kindt v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd.,
67 F.3d 266 (9th Cir. 1995), we upheld a spectator’s ejection
from a public meeting only because he was “disrupting the
proceedings by yelling and trying to speak when it was not
time for” discussion. Id. at 271. Had he been given a chance,
Norse could no doubt have presented lots more evidence that
he never disrupted the Santa Cruz council meeting, but what
would have been the point? The video speaks for itself: Norse
raises his hand in a brief, silent protest of the mayor’s treatment of another speaker. The mayor ignores Norse’s fleeting
gesture until Councilman Fitzmaurice throws a hissy fit.
“Listeners’ reaction to speech is not a content-neutral basis
for regulation. . . . Speech cannot be . . . punished or banned[ ]
simply because it might offend a hostile” member of the Santa
Cruz City Council. Forsyth Cnty., Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134-35 (1992). The council members
should have known that the government may never suppress
NORSE v. SANTA CRUZ 20089
Case: 07-15814 12/15/2010 Page: 21 of 22 ID: 7580981 DktEntry: 50-1viewpoints it doesn’t like. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). Though
defendants point to Norse’s reaction to Councilman Fitzmaurice as the “disruption” that warranted carting him off to jail,
Norse’s calm assertion of his constitutional rights was not the
least bit disruptive. The First Amendment would be meaningless if Councilman Fitzmaurice’s petty pique justified Norse’s
arrest and removal.
Even viewing the facts most favorably to the city council
members, their behavior amounts to classic viewpoint discrimination for which they’re not entitled to qualified immunity. And that’s what the district court should have held when
it set about resolving qualified immunity as a matter of law.
If it was going to take it upon itself to grant summary judgment to anyone on that issue, it should have been to Norse.
On remand, the district court can set things right by holding,
as a matter of law, that the city council members are not entitled to qualified immunity, and proceeding to assess damages.
This is Actions I have researched
and letters and copies of facts related to views
I received your message and am happy to provide you with a copy of the impeachment statutes below for your reference.
Our office does not maintain a history of the impeachment process or the even any data about when or if the process has been used in Indiana. Our office exists as a resource to local election officials, candidates, media, and members of the public on the right to vote, conducting an election, the absentee voting process and campaign finance issues.
Thank you for contacting our office.
Leslie A. Barnes
Co-Counsel, Indiana Election Division
302 W. Washington Street, #E204
Indianapolis, IN 46204
If a person is unclear concerning election law provisions, the Election Division can serve as an interpretive source. However, where important legal rights are concerned, you must consult with your own attorney to be fully and properly advised.
Information Maintained by the Office of Code Revision Indiana Legislative Services Agency
ARTICLE 8. OFFICERS' IMPEACHMENT, REMOVAL, RESIGNATION, AND DISQUALIFICATION
Chapter 1. Impeachment and Removal From Office
Officers; judges; prosecuting attorney; liability to impeachment
Sec. 1. (a) Under Article 6, Sections 7 and 8 of the Constitution of the State of Indiana, all state officers other than justices of the supreme court or judges of the court of appeals of Indiana or the Indiana tax court, all other judges, prosecuting attorneys, and all county, city, town, and township officers are liable to impeachment for any misdemeanor in office.
(b) A justice of the supreme court or a judge of the court of appeals of Indiana or of the Indiana tax court is subject to removal from office under Article 7, Section 11 of the Constitution of the State of Indiana.
(Formerly: Acts 1897, c.182, s.1.) As amended by P.L.3-1993, SEC.241.
Method of impeachment
Sec. 2. All impeachments must be by resolution, adopted, originated in and conducted by managers elected by the house of representatives, who must prepare articles of impeachment, present them at the bar of the senate and prosecute the same, and the trial must be had before the senate sitting as a court of impeachment.
(Formerly: Acts 1897, c.182, s.2.)
Articles of impeachment
Sec. 3. When an officer is impeached by the house of representatives for a misdemeanor in office, the articles of impeachment must be delivered to the president of the senate, saving and excepting only that in case the officer impeached be the governor, lieutenant-governor, or the acting president of the senate, such articles shall be delivered to the secretary of the senate.
(Formerly: Acts 1897, c.182, s.3.)
Sec. 4. The senate must assign a day for the hearing of the impeachment, and inform the managers elected by the house of representatives thereof. The secretary of the senate must cause a copy of the articles of impeachment, with a notice to appear and answer the same at the time and place appointed, to be served on the defendant not less than ten (10) days before the day fixed for the hearing.
(Formerly: Acts 1897, c.182, s.4.)
Service upon defendant
Sec. 5. The service must be made upon the defendant personally, or if he can not, upon diligent inquiry, be found within the state, the senate, upon proof of the fact, may order publication to be made, in such manner as it may deem proper, of a notice requiring him to appear at a specified time and place and answer the articles of impeachment.
(Formerly: Acts 1897, c.182, s.5.)
Absence of defendant
Sec. 6. If the defendant does not appear, the senate, upon proof of service or publication, as provided in the two (2) sections last preceding, may, of its own motion, or for cause shown, assign another day for hearing the impeachment, or may proceed, in the absence of the defendant, to trial and judgment.
(Formerly: Acts 1897, c.182, s.6.)
Objections to articles of impeachment; pleas
Sec. 7. When the defendant appears, he may in writing object to the sufficiency of the articles of impeachment, or he may answer the same by an oral plea of not guilty, which plea must be entered upon the journal and put in issue every material allegation of the articles of impeachment.
(Formerly: Acts 1897, c.182, s.7.)
Answering articles of impeachment; judgment
Sec. 8. If the objection to the sufficiency of the articles of impeachment is not sustained by a majority of the members of the senate who heard the argument, the defendant must be ordered forthwith to answer the articles of impeachment. If he then pleads guilty, the senate must render judgment of conviction against him. If he plead not guilty, or refuses to plead, the senate must, at such time as it may appoint, proceed to try the impeachment.
(Formerly: Acts 1897, c.182, s.8.)
Sec. 9. At the time and place appointed, and before the senate proceeds to act on the impeachment, the secretary must administer to the president of the senate, and the president of the senate to each of the members of the senate then present, an oath, truly and impartially to hear, try and determine the impeachment; and no member of the senate can vote or act upon the impeachment, or upon any question arising thereon, without having taken such oath.
(Formerly: Acts 1897, c.182, s.9.)
Sec. 10. The defendant can not be convicted on impeachment without the concurrence of two-thirds of the members elected, voting by ayes and noes, and if two-thirds of the members elected do not concur in a conviction, he must be acquitted.
(Formerly: Acts 1897, c.182, s.10.)
Sec. 11. After conviction, the senate must, at such time as it may appoint, pronounce judgment, in the form of resolution entered upon the journals of the senate.
(Formerly: Acts 1897, c.182, s.11.)
Resolution of acquittal or conviction
Sec. 12. On the adoption of the resolution by a majority of the members present who voted on the question of acquittal or conviction, it becomes the judgment of the senate.
(Formerly: Acts 1897, c.182, s.12.)
Suspension or removal from office
Sec. 13. The judgment may be that the defendant be suspended or that he be removed from office and disqualified to hold any office of honor, trust or profit, under the state.
(Formerly: Acts 1897, c.182, s.13.)
Disqualification of defendant from receiving salaries
Sec. 14. If judgment of suspension is given, the defendant, during the continuance thereof, is disqualified from receiving the salary, fees or emoluments of the office.
(Formerly: Acts 1897, c.182, s.14.)
Temporary suspension during pendency of proceedings; filling vacancies
Sec. 15. Whenever articles of impeachment against any officer subject to impeachment are presented to the senate, such officer is temporarily suspended from office and cannot act in the officer's official capacity until the officer is acquitted. Upon such suspension of any officer other than the governor, the office must, at once, be temporarily filled by an appointment made by the governor, with the advice and consent of the senate, until the acquittal of the party impeached, or, in case of removal, until the vacancy is filled as required by law.
(Formerly: Acts 1897, c.182, s.15.) As amended by P.L.3-1989, SEC.27.
Impeachment of governor or lieutenant governor; chief justice to preside
Sec. 16. If the governor or lieutenant-governor is impeached, the chief justice of the Supreme Court of the state shall preside over the senate during the impeachment trial, but he shall not have the right to vote.
(Formerly: Acts 1897, c.182, s.16.)
Indictment or information not barred
Sec. 17. If the offense for which the defendant is convicted on impeachment is also the subject of an indictment or information, the indictment or information is not barred hereby.
(Formerly: Acts 1897, c.182, s.17.)
Senate to continue in session
Sec. 18. In case impeachment proceedings be pending in the senate at the time of the expiration of any session of the general assembly, the senate shall be continued in session for the sole and only purpose of sitting as a court of impeachment until such impeachment proceedings be concluded, and may, pending the conclusion of such impeachment proceedings, adjourn from time to time, as it may deem expedient.
(Formerly: Acts 1897, c.182, s.18.)
Judge or prosecuting attorney; duties of attorney general
Sec. 19. (a) Under Article 7, Section 13 of the Constitution of the State of Indiana, whenever a circuit, superior, or probate court judge or prosecuting attorney has been convicted of corruption or any other high crime, the attorney general shall bring proceedings in the supreme court, on information, in the name of the state, for the removal from office of the judge or prosecuting attorney.
(b) If the judgment is against the defendant, the defendant is removed from office. The governor, the officer, or the entity required to fill a vacancy under IC 3-13-6-2 shall, subject to:
(1) IC 33-33-2-39;
(2) IC 33-33-2-43;
(3) IC 33-33-45-38; and
(4) IC 33-33-71-40;
appoint or select a successor to fill the vacancy in office.
(Formerly: Acts 1897, c.182, s.19.) As amended by P.L.3-1987, SEC.497; P.L.3-1993, SEC.242; P.L.16-1995, SEC.3; P.L.19-1995, SEC.4; P.L.98-2004, SEC.62; P.L.201-2011, SEC.7.
(Repealed by P.L.3-1993, SEC.282.)
Written accusations; grand jury
Sec. 21. An accusation in writing against any district officer, county officer, township officer, municipal officer, or prosecuting attorney may be presented by the grand jury of the county in which the officer accused is elected or appointed.
(Formerly: Acts 1897, c.182, s.21.) As amended by P.L.1-1990, SEC.56.
Form of accusation
Sec. 22. The accusation must state the offense charged in ordinary and concise language, and without repetition.
(Formerly: Acts 1897, c.182, s.22.)
Delivery of accusations; service on defendant
Sec. 23. The accusation must be delivered by the foreman of the grand jury to the prosecuting attorney of the county, except when he is the officer accused, who must cause a copy thereof to be served upon the defendant, and require, by notice in writing of not less than ten (10) days, that he appear before the circuit court of the county at the time mentioned in the notice, and answer the accusation. The original accusation must then be filed with the clerk of the court, or if he be the party accused, with the judge of the court.
(Formerly: Acts 1897, c.182, s.23.) As amended by P.L.3-1993, SEC.243.
Appearance of defendant
Sec. 24. The defendant must appear at the time appointed in the notice and answer the accusation, unless, for some sufficient cause, the court assign another day for that purpose. If he does not appear, the court may proceed to hear and determine the accusation in his absence.
(Formerly: Acts 1897, c.182, s.24.)
Sec. 25. The defendant may answer the accusation either by objecting to the sufficiency thereof, or of any article therein, or by denying the truth of the same.
(Formerly: Acts 1897, c.182, s.25.)
Objections to legal sufficiency of accusation
Sec. 26. If the defendant objects to the legal sufficiency of the accusation, the objection must be in writing, but need not be in any specific form, it being sufficient if it presents intelligibly the grounds of the objection.
(Formerly: Acts 1897, c.182, s.26.)
Denial of accusation
Sec. 27. If he denies the truth of the accusation, the denial may be oral and without oath, and must be entered upon the minutes.
(Formerly: Acts 1897, c.182, s.27.)
Objection to accusation not sustained
Sec. 28. If an objection to the sufficiency of the accusation is not sustained, the defendant must answer thereto forthwith.
(Formerly: Acts 1897, c.182, s.28.)
Guilty plea or refusal to answer; not guilty plea
Sec. 29. If the defendant pleads guilty, or refuses to answer the accusation, the court must render judgment of conviction against him. If he denies the matters charged, the court must immediately, or at such time as it may appoint, proceed to try the accusation.
(Formerly: Acts 1897, c.182, s.29.)
Sec. 30. The trial must be by a jury, and conducted in all respects in the same manner as the trial of an indictment for a misdemeanor.
(Formerly: Acts 1897, c.182, s.30.)
Attendance of witnesses
Sec. 31. The prosecuting attorney and the defendant are respectively entitled to such process as may be necessary to enforce the attendance of witnesses, as upon a trial of an indictment.
(Formerly: Acts 1897, c.182, s.31.)
(Repealed by Acts 1982, P.L.34, SEC.2.)
(Repealed by Acts 1982, P.L.34, SEC.2.)
Removal of prosecuting attorney; proceedings
Sec. 34. The same proceedings maybe had on like grounds for the removal of a prosecuting attorney, except that the accusation must be
delivered by the foreman of the grand jury to the clerk, and by him to the judge of the circuit court of the county, or criminal court, if such court exists in the county, who must thereupon notify the attorney-general to act as prosecuting officer in the matter, and shall designate some resident attorney to act as assistant to the attorney-general in such prosecution, whose compensation shall be fixed by the court and paid out of the county treasury.
(Formerly: Acts 1897, c.182, s.34.)
Verification of accusation; citing party; hearing; judgment
Sec. 35. (a) When an accusation in writing, verified by the oath of any person, is presented to a circuit court, alleging that any officer within the jurisdiction of the court has been guilty of:
(1) charging and collecting illegal fees for services rendered or to be rendered in his office;
(2) refusing or neglecting to perform the official duties pertaining to his office; or
(3) violating IC 36-6-4-17(b) if the officer is the executive of a township;
the court must cite the party charged to appear before the court at any time not more than ten (10) nor less than five (5) days from the time the accusation was presented, and on that day or some other subsequent day not more than twenty (20) days from the time the accusation was presented must proceed to hear, in a summary manner, the accusation and evidence offered in support of the same, and the answer and evidence offered by the party accused.
(b) If after the hearing under subsection (a) it appears that the charge is sustained, the court must do the following:
(1) Enter a decree that the party accused be deprived of his office.
(2) Enter a judgment as follows:
(A) For five hundred dollars ($500) in favor of the prosecuting officer.
(B) For costs as are allowed in civil cases.
(C) For the amount of money that was paid to the officer in compensation from the day when the accusation was filed under this section to the day when judgment is entered in favor of the public entity paying the compensation to the officer.
(c) In an action under this section, a court may award reasonable attorney's fees, court costs, and other reasonable expenses of litigation to the accused officer if:
(1) the officer prevails; and
(2) the court finds that the accusation is frivolous or vexatious.
(Formerly: Acts 1897, c.182, s.35.) As amended by P.L.34-1992, SEC.1.
(Repealed by Acts 1982, P.L.34, SEC.2.)
(Repealed by P.L.37-2008, SEC.4.)
Felony conviction; removal; appeal; reinstatement; remuneration; vacancy
Sec. 38. (a) The following definitions apply throughout this section:
(1) "Felony" has the meaning set forth in IC 3-8-1-5.
(2) "Public officer" means any person, elected or appointed, who holds any state, county, township, city, or town office.
(b) Any public officer convicted of a felony during the public officer's term of office shall:
(1) be removed from office by operation of law when:
(A) in a jury trial, a jury publicly announces a verdict against the person for a felony;
(B) in a bench trial, the court publicly announces a verdict against the person for a felony; or
(C) in a guilty plea hearing, the person pleads guilty or nolo contendere to a felony; and
(2) not receive any salary or remuneration from the time the public officer is removed from office under subdivision (1).
(c) The subsequent reduction of a felony to a Class A misdemeanor under IC 35-50-2-7 or IC 35-38-1-1.5 after the:
(1) jury has announced its verdict against the person for a felony;
(2) court has announced its verdict against the person for a felony; or
(3) person has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to a felony;
does not affect the operation of subsection (b).
(d) If the conviction is:
(3) set aside;
(4) for a felony other than a felony arising out of an action taken in the public officer's official capacity, reduced to a Class A misdemeanor under IC 35-50-2-7 or IC 35-38-1-1.5; or
(5) not entered because the trial court did not accept the guilty plea;
and the public officer's term has not expired, the public officer shall be reinstated in office and receive any salary or other remuneration that the public officer would have received had the public officer not been removed from office.
(e) If the conviction is reversed, vacated, or set aside and the public officer's term has expired, the public officer shall receive any salary or other remuneration that the public officer would have received had the public officer not been removed from office.
(f) A vacancy in a public office caused by the removal of a public officer under this section shall be filled as provided by law. If a convicted public officer is reinstated, the person filling the office during the appeal shall cease to hold the office.
(g) This subsection applies whenever:
(1) a public officer is removed from office by operation of law under subsection (b); and
(2) a vacancy occurs in a state, county, township, city, or town office as the result of the removal from office.
The court must file a certified copy of the sentencing order with the person who is entitled under IC 5-8-6 to receive notice of the death of an individual holding the office. The person receiving a copy of the sentencing order must give notice of the vacancy in the same manner as if the person had received a notice under IC 5-8-6. The person who is required or permitted to fill the vacancy must comply with IC 3-13.
(h) This subsection applies if a public officer is reinstated in office under subsection (d). The court must file a certified copy of the order reversing, vacating, reducing, or setting aside the conviction with the person who is entitled under IC 5-8-6 to receive notice of the death of an individual holding the office. The person receiving a copy of the order must give notice of the reinstatement in the same manner as notice of a vacancy would be given under IC 5-8-6. The person receiving a copy of the order must also give notice to the person who was selected to fill the vacancy before the reinstatement occurred.
As added by P.L.37-2008, SEC.2
Felony for Violating Civil Rights Or Interfering With Providing Evidence of Major Crimes Title 42 USC § 1985 Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights Title 42 U.S.C. § 1986. Action for neglect to prevent conspiracy
Felony for Violating Civil Rights Or
Interfering With Providing
Evidence of Major Crimes
Title 42 USC § 1985 Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights
(2) Obstructing justice; intimidating party, witness, or juror. If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to deter, by force, intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any court of the United States from attending such court, or from testifying to any matter pending therein, freely, fully, and truthfully, or to injure such party or witness in his person or property on account of his having so attended or testified−
Or to influence the verdict, presentment, or indictment of any grand or petit juror in any such court, or to injure such juror in his person or property on account of any verdict, presentment, or indictment lawfully assented to by him, or of his being or having been such juror; or if two or more persons conspire for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the law, or to injure him or his property for lawfully enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the right of any person, or class of persons, to the equal protection of the laws.
Felony For Failure to Prevent Such Violations
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1986. Action for neglect to prevent conspiracy
Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be done, and mentioned in the preceding section [42 USCS § 1985], are about to be committed, and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same, neglects or refuses to do so, if such wrongful act be committed, shall be liable to the party injured, or his legal representatives, for all damages caused by such wrongful act, which such person by reasonable diligence could have prevented; and such damages may be recovered in an action on the case;
And any number of persons guilty of such wrongful neglect or refusal may be joined as defendants in the action, and if the death of any party be caused by any such wrongful act and neglect, the legal representatives of the deceased shall have such action therefore, and may recover not exceeding five thousand dollars damages therein, for the benefit of the widow of the deceased, if there be one, and if there be no widow, then for the benefit of the next of kin of the deceased. But no action under the provisions of this section shall be sustained which is not commenced within one year after the cause of action has accrued.
Purpose of the Violations
As it relates to this Internet site, the purpose for a continuing series of major civil rights violations was to halt the efforts by a former federal agent to report, publicize, and halt corruption related to a series of airline disasters, and criminal activities in other areas that he and his coalition of other insiders had discovered as part of their official and/or insider activities.
History of Prior Fraud-Related Disasters
Enabled by Corruption and Cover-Ups,
Sampling of Subsequent Events Associated
With Civil Rights Violations to Silence a
Former Federal Agent and His Coalition
Forewarned Bombings of U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania
List of Documentary Books
On Endemic Corruption in the United States
More Information about these books by clicking here.