Evolution of Love 2

Military Planning

How flawed military planning causes a mess
It appears that no effort was made to gain intelligence about the Ukrainian forces, their weapons, staying power and tactics of war fighting. Taking Crimea as a template, Russia underestimated the resistance of its adversary and the scale of operations required — a clear case of imitation of success despite the changed circumstances. Even a limited war has to be planned in terms of total national resources, factoring in the contingency of escalation to total war.

Russia may have overestimated its capabilities and the force level required to capture Ukrainian capital Kyiv.

The stalled Russian offensive in Ukraine and last year’s messy withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan have brought into focus the role of military planners in conceptualising and fleshing out operational plans. While military planning cannot be carried out in a vacuum and has to be predicated on political directions or national objectives, mistakes are costly and result in avoidable loss of lives. By its very chaotic nature, conflict is impossible to anticipate precisely. The challenge for military professionals is to make a reasonable assessment, not to be too off the mark so as to align policy with resources in the planning process. Invariably in war, plans seldom match the reality on the ground. However, a wide knowledge base, experience and reflection can reduce the probability of plans going horrifically wrong.




In the Ukraine conflict, while the information from both sides has been sketchy and exaggerated so far, Russia apparently failed to follow its own doctrine. Many Indian Army officers used to be sent to Russia in the 1980s to attend courses on mechanised warfare and operational manoeuvre theory.

It appears that no effort was made to gain intelligence about the Ukrainian forces, their weapons, equipment, force levels, staying power and tactics of war fighting. Taking Crimea as a template, Russia underestimated the resistance of its adversary and the scale of operations required — a clear case of imitation of success despite the changed circumstances. Even a limited war has to be planned in terms of total national resources, factoring in the contingency of escalation to total war.

The around 60-km-long Russian convoy stalled on the road to Kyiv for days showed military incompetence and utter disregard for the conduct of operations at the tactical level. Similarly, Russia may have overestimated its own capabilities and the force level required to capture Kyiv. It is reported that Russian forces went into battle with only two to three days’ worth of supplies, and a lack of transport led to difficulties in replenishing supplies on the ground — a poor example of logistic planning and sustainment.

Instead of controlling the operational space, drawing out Ukrainian forces from built-up areas, degrading the communication set-up, destroying fire control and command and control centres, the Russian effort to capture cities by direct attacks facilitated the hit-and-run tactics of the Ukrainian forces. This led to heavy casualties on the Russian side and the killing of an unusually high number of senior commanders in the war, provoking further attacks on the cities.


In the case of Afghanistan, the US President’s decision, announced in April 2021, to withdraw American troops by the symbolically significant date of September 11 left inadequate time for ensuring an orderly exit. The issue was not the decision to withdraw but the manner in which it was planned and executed. Gen Kenneth McKenzie, the then Commander of the United States Central Command, said the civilian evacuation ended about 12 hours before the final withdrawal. Some equipment was brought out on the final flights, but other equipment — such as the counter-rocket artillery and mortar (C-RAM) system and various aircraft and vehicles — was left behind permanently disabled.

The Senate Foreign Relations (SFR) Committee issued a report which was a scathing critique of the Biden administration’s failures that allowed for a quick Taliban takeover of Afghanistan and an inept withdrawal that left thousands of Americans and Afghan interpreters and guides behind. The SFR report claims that 4,000 to 9,000 American citizens were left behind in Afghanistan on August 31, 2021.


The report states that officials were still formulating a withdrawal plan a day before Kabul fell to the Taliban, despite the fact that President Biden had announced the withdrawal from Afghanistan four months earlier. Also, there was a failure of coordination between the State Department and the Defence Department. Early abandonment of the Bagram air force base was inexcusable. In fact, in mid-August, 6,000 troops had to be sent back to Kabul to bolster the protection of the airport. This clearly indicates a faulty appreciation of force requirement till the final exit from Kabul.

Allowing weapons, helicopters, classified material and ammunition to fall into the hands of the Taliban was unpardonable. Moreover, there are reports that the equipment used by the US-led allied forces during the war in Afghanistan has found its way to terror groups in Jammu and Kashmir, including iridium satellite phones and WiFi-enabled thermal imaging devices.


Military common sense would have indicated to any professional army officer the sequencing of the operation — evacuation of civilians and allies followed by the withdrawal of combat forces. In such a situation, phased withdrawal of troops from various bases and the evacuation from the US embassy with alternative secure lines of communication should have been evident from the planning process.

What could be the reasons for unprofessional military planning in these two cases? Perhaps, the roots lie in their respective military education systems. While attending the Staff Course at Camberley (UK) in 1992-93, the writer observed that participants from Europe and America had more experience and practical knowledge about generic strategic issues such as application of force, coalition force operations, force projection and inter-agency coordination. Their comprehension of conduct of specific operations on varying terrains was restricted. This could be directly attributed to their operational experiences in the NATO environment in Western Europe and the first Gulf War (1990-91). Furthermore, these countries largely had stable borders and most of them did not face any direct territorial threat, obviating sustained deployment of defence forces along the borders.