The authors of numerous books, which have been recently published, try to analyze, why the Red Army was defeated at the beginning of World War II. It can be explained by the following. The USSR suffered great civilian and military casualties and material losses at the beginning of the war. The country was on the verge of a catastrophe. The results of the war influenced the development of the USSR for a long time and led to a catastrophe in August 1991. In fact both events - the beginning of the war in 1941 and the August putsh in 1991 – have much in common, though no one admitted it for a long time.
In the 1930-s the head of the NKVD Yagoda established his interception empire in the USSR. It was a unique system, which made it possible to wiretap anyone in the Soviet Union: not only Stalin, the mighty leader of the country, but also directors of state farms and collective farms. Besides various special equipment the NKVD purchased several hundred thousand microphones, and more than twenty thousand kilometres of wires to connect them.
Yagoda organized the NKVD special communication in the country, which intercepted a great number of Soviet citizens. The NKVD spent a lot of money, mainly in foreign currency, to create “the Big Ear of the Kremlin”*. The Soviet Union didn’t manufacture enough special equipment of high quality at that time.
Why couldn’t “the Big Ear of the Kremlin” hear the thunder of the German armada approach our boarders in June 1941? There are a great number of memoirs and researches narrating about the terrible first days of the Great Patriotic War and about the causes of our army’s defeat and retreat.
The authors of the researches provided interesting statistics about the strength of the army, the enemy’s armament, instructions and orders of the German military and political leaders and tried to find the real cause of the defeat of the Soviet army at the beginning of the Great Patriotic war. For some reason none of them discussed in detail the cause of the defeat Stalin had pointed at, though some of the authors were aware, that the head of the country was well informed about it. Why didn’t either Soviet or foreign historians and researchers study it? What prevented them from doing it? Was it a lack of historical facts or an aforethought reluctance to discuss and study the subject? Maybe some authors intended not to highlight the Soviet leaders’ errors during the preparation for the war to make our country repeat them again and again in future?
I’ve made an attempt to answer the question in my article “Hitler’s Information Weapons”. I suppose the subject is very urgent for contemporary Russia.
* The Moscow Kremlin sometimes referred to as simply “the Kremlin”, is a historic fortified complex at the heart of Moscow. It is the best known of kremlins (Russian citadels) and includes four palaces, four cathedrals, and the enclosing Kremlin Wall with Kremlin towers. The complex serves as the official residence of the President of Russia. The name The Kremlin is often used to refer to the government of the Soviet Union (1922–1991) and its highest members (such as general secretaries, premiers, presidents, ministers, and commissars), in the same way the name “the White House” refers to the executive branch of the government of the United States.