Interim Critique of Short Treatise

A flawed "critique" I wrote. Feel free to comment on its flaws.

(Based On: Spinoza's Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-being.)


Chapter I: The Confusion of God



I: "The essence of things are from all eternity, and unto all eternity shall remain immutable; The existence of God is essence."— Chapter 1.



The confusion lies on the rationalization of eternity and infinity of any entity than of simply describing it as "nature." Spinoza expects the readers to immediately understand what the word "eternity," "immutable," "existence," and "essence" that God possessed is; obviously, this is a fallacy: Per se, we are living in the 1600s, I expect you to immediately understand that the human body is composed of "dendrilitic-meta egnum" (some fancy and meaningless terminology). Without any guidance on what it is, where it is, or how/why it is, it is perceivable that my own terminology collapses on its own. This is the same case for Spinoza.

Now, in relation to Spinoza's claim, would it not make sense that it is of necessity to inquire the "where," "how," and "what" questions to approve of its existence? This is not the case for Spinoza. The three (eternity, essence, and immutable) are immediately attached to the image of God; to an extent, why is this? How does such naturalistic material attached themselves to one another? Therefore, a verification on how a material attaches to one another in order to make a whole must be proven.

However, this is not the case for Spinoza. Spinoza relies on the narrative of "because it just is." We are prohibited to ask such questions to approve and prove of God's "existence is essence" is due to the tendency on rational appeal. Consequently, inquiring further contains the possibility of deminishing Spinoza's claim on God— to which I think is undesirable in his position.

Insistently, if I say that God is everywhere and anywhere, my assertion should prove therefore of God is indeed anywhere and everywhere; rational reasoning should stand and prevail against the constant barrage of inquiries in regards to metaphysical and/or empirical investigations. Any limitation would otherwise arise under constant pressure— a reminder, this is good for enhancing and strengthening one's knowledge. If such case proves not to be, a reconsideration on one's proposition is a must— nor the author or writer is at risk of dying if his/her own proposition were to be proven false. Furthermore, if Spinoza's claim were to crumble under constant barrage of inquiries, then it is false; and, if Spinoza avoids or dismiss (or is potentially unaware of) the broadness of the topic about ​God, then Spinoza's claims are ignorant: the failure to address the potential gap or inadequacies of Spinoza's claim is an evidence to his own ignorance.

It must be addressed: How can we know God possessed the traits of eternity, essence, and immutable? It is an extraordinary claim to begin with. This is similar to my claim earlier that our body is composed of dendrilitic-meta egnum— a set of inquiry must be asked: Where is this located? How does it functions? And, what is it made/composed of? We cannot ask, yet, on "why is it?" since our inquiry is incomplete, for the time being.

To begin, where can we find eternity? How is eternity so? What made it possible to have an eternity? Is eternity a linguistic-construct concept? Can we arrive at "eternity"? And so on.

If all answers for these continuous set of questions are solely answit is then limited.

Per se, I describe "eternity" as the body of a crocodile, and Spinoza disagreed and gave a reason and definition on what "eternity" is— this is potentially good. But, since both of us only asserted something through reason and definition alone, and nobody were able to provide an evidence on what "eternity" is, both of us are insufficient in reason at the end. I am not solely focusing on empirical claim here, but the futileness if two were two exist yet both cannot prove something within their vicinity. Then, we probe into the metaphysics and its subset to inquire what "eternity" is. Yet, we can only derive inquiries and never able to forge our way out of metaphysics itself: Inquirers only resides in metaphysics, not for those who ask for answers. It must be a mission: Before making the word "God" and its attached attributes to "it/him," it must be fundamentally questioned on how these attributes formed and where they are limited in attaching to.

Spinoza is trying to make sense of the incomprehensible world than of making it as is. This proves to us: "If man has an idea of God, then God must exist formaliter"— Chapter 1. We seem to probe firstly on the idea of God is. I assume that Spinoza's God is an all-knowing being and all-powerful being. If this is God, then what makes something as God? In a sense that, how did God became a God? How did Spinoza knew the characteristics of God is? From his statement, the general simplification of "essence," "eternity," and "immutable" must be scrutinize on. By dissecting what made "essence" and therefore attributed to God, would it make sense if I simply assert that something is of "essence" without fully accounting on its components preceding its forms? Also, what made "eternity"? I mean no harm upon scrutinizing such initial justification on "eternity" is. Simply, by mere proposition, philosophy is a discipline spanned throughout humanity's eternity— this is questionable since, under anthropological beginnings, philosophy did not existed yet; wherefore, on certain matter, the bacteria or particles that created the living forms do not have the means to philosophize such non-matter if they are themselves a non-living matter. By "naturalistic" tendency, Spinoza's God can be attributed to a non-living matter for suited perfectly the description of "eternal," "essence," and "immutable."

We must firstly understand what made him God before he was a God. Since God is an idea, what made the idea an idea? Or rather, on what sense the idea of God was spread or distributed and made, therefore, believable? Indeed, it is rationally and logically appealing if something is beyond comprehension— this is, the origination of all. Per se, how come color became color? If so is color, where did even color come from— within the boundaries of physics? If those matter can made color, how did those matter even begin? If those beginning then began, how did the matter came before those beginning? All of questions are linkable to one another, and therefore endless on itself. This is rationally and logically appealing. However, even if answers have been gathered, certain things are not certain enough. Probing into matters too deeply certainly remove the inquirer from God. This is, now, the epistemological consequence of inquiry.

Even if one were to probe deeply into the idea of God through the means of epistemology, it is undeniable to perceive the hidden physical abuses and injustices and inequality that continually exists and persists in life. Certainly, the idea of God is not so benevolent at this time in comparison to rational and/or logical deduction to God.



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II: "The first is proved by the first principle, namely, that the knowable things are infinitely numerous. Also, following the second principle, man cannot know all, because the human understanding is finite, and if not determined by external things to know this sooner than that, and that sooner than this, then according to the third principle it should be impossible for it to know anything."— Chapter 1.



How come the connection to God is through infinity and incomprehensibility? If things are infinite, then it is the byproduct of human intellectual exercise into advancement; if things are incomprehensible, then it is the byproduct of unlearned language. But, if this is so, then how come there is a Bible? If God's word is then infinite, why did God opt to the language the Bible was written to? Why not Chinese? If so not, why not Chinese be the first language? The God is then unjust and, by part, irrational. Prosecuting further, is Chinese undesirable language to be written in Bible? Why was the first language the Bible is written on in Hebrew? This proves the simple acceptance and rejects any further suggestion to matter.


"Once, however, it is assumed that this idea [of God] is a fiction, then all other ideas that we have must be fictions no less."— Chapter 1.

Then, the defeatist attitude revels. Supposedly, we assume that God is a fictional character, how then can we prove his existence? This is much like to thinking of, "How can we know Charlotte Brönte truly existed and her work is not written by Karl Marx or other ghostwriter? Was Charlotte Brönte a true name?" Notice, this is the difficult part of inquiry into matters and substances. By claiming something as, "If Z is fiction, then all letters that precedes it is fiction," is a defeatist attitude into matter. Supposedly, if Z is false, what made Z false? In this course, we probe deeply into Z and not into totality of matter. Similarly by saying it as, if a person loses a limb, he is not then a normal human being. This is simply false.



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III: "I therefore see now that the truth, essence, or existence of anything never depends on me: for, as was shown with reference to the second kind of ideas, they are what they are independently of me, whether as regards their essence alone, or as regards both essence and existence."— Chapter 1.

'Independently of me,' Spinoza asserted. In such inquiry, without the necessity of usage to modern information, it reduces the cases into anatomical studies and inquiries. Given the narrative of "They are what they are," it defeats the purpose of advancements or inquiry itself. A collection of findings or evidences to account the microcosm of matters would not exist if we solely rely on theological/religious basis. Aristotle, in his work "Physics," asserted that we must work and investigate on whether something is either false or evidently provable drawn from science. If we accept things are what they are, we are not engaging in the principle of science, but of religious or political domain.

If ideas are "they are what they are" it also leads us to another defeatist and reductionist attitude of Spinoza. The narrative of, "They are what they are," never aligns with mathematics and other hard sciences. If we accept that there is a soul possessing the human body, then the anatomical studies conducted back then was futile and meaningless since there is "indeed" a soul within the human body.

Also, upon noticement, Spinoza never gave any historical structure to what God is, or where did his God came from. Is it from Christian influence? A Buddhist? What is it? If by simple stating that God is within the bounds of perceivable infinity, it should be considered that infinity itself is a human construct from intellectual exercise; otherwise, we have to resort to caveman-like counting or discrete counting without expanding into the means of infinity in mathematics. Then, it must be considered: Spinoza's God is solely from his own deduction from nature, thus, this is a subjective interpretation or deduction to God. Spinoza's God is one and inherent with nature, then it does not concern to any moral and ethical values unlike to what Christianity proposes. Simply enough, and unfortunate at the same time, Spinoza's God is a philosophical-rationalize idol. Since nature is indeed infinite on its own— this is, the originations of cloud and diverse kinds of trees, and so on— it is expelled to treat it with an explanation that utterly deduce and deconstruct it from its wholeness. Otherwise, Spinoza would somehow link his God's relation to a religion; however, this was not the case. Then, it regresses his infinity God into finite— the lackness of moral and ethical lessons since trees do not speak of moral nor ethical values unlike to what God(s) in religion does.



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IV: "Consequently, if he did not exist, I should not be able to assert anything at all about him, although this can be done in the case of other things, even when they do not exist He must also be, indeed, the subjectum of all other things."— Chapter 1.

A problematic assertion was made. If something does not exist, it does not negate entirely the existence of one thing. This deprives us of investigation to matter. Per se, during the 1600s, I have written a description of a horse to which I have seen: A horse with pink skin, blue-black stripped hair, and a straight horn at its front of its head— above and in-between its eyes. Now, using the narrative of, "If he (it) did not exist, I should not be able to assert anything at all about him (it)," this entirely, and with respect to totalitarian proposition, exists without the means of your skepticism since I saw it. If another person were to question on where I found it, I would deprive him of details and confidently state that "It exists."



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V: "The infinite attributes themselves which tell us that they are, without however telling us, at the same time, what they are; for only of two do we know what they are."— Chapter 1.

This entirely encapsulates the argument to Spinoza's God: What for is his God if he deviates from the core definition of affiliation to what God is? Rather, his "God" (for we must necessitate to alter his "God" into something else— an ideal matter) is utterly surrounded by science. Wherefore, in some sense and modernity, Spinoza is an atheist who proposes his own definition of God since he cannot accept a religious God is. In its own terms, it is similar to some individual proposing democracy than of republic state.

In this too, it should inquired upon on what constitutes as "infinite attributes." What truly is it? Or, what attributes belongs to infinite attributes? Similarly, this is stating that airplane is entirely a body of an airplane— not asking what made or what belongs to an airplane before it was an "airplane."



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VI: "Now, that man has the idea of God, this is clear, because he knows his attributes, which attributes cannot be derived from [man] himself, because he is imperfect."— Chapter 1.

A reductionist conclusion. Wording appropriately: A finite being can move forth into understanding the infinity, for infinity is then constructed by the finite themselves. The sole issue of Spinoza is ending all alternative attitudes into understanding his assertions, which is a fallacy on its own for all sciences requires understanding in other forms of matter. I am not aware of the currents on what occupation or discipline does Spinoza belongs to, but, basing from the assertions he made, he is an atheist adapting the concept of God— an incomplete God— from religious narratives for Spinoza does not agree with the definition of a God from religion. Also, on its own, Spinoza demonstrated his own fallacy by asserting that a finite or imperfect being— Spinoza does not differ to us human beings for he is also a finite himself— cannot derived attributes from himself (a human or mortal), then Spinoza's God is still relatively vague for he is also an imperfect being.



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VII: "God, however, who is the first cause of all things, and also the cause of himself [causa sui], makes himself known through himself."— Chapter 1.

It must be noticed: God cannot be a "God" without someone appointing him as "God" or lending, assigning him the title of a "God." What do you call a person who studies the matters of the natural world? One could deliberately say, a physicist, geologist, or even, chemist. Then, who appointed such name? Can a physicist label another physicist without any means of priori and complexity of English Language and its etymology? Then, either an etymologists assigns one or a historian. Either so would suffice. Then, it shall be notice: The ones who crafted and assigned labels are created, formed, and invented by either an etymologist and/or a historian. Otherwise, who?

Assertively, even without the critical proposition on God, the word "God" provides an ease to a chaotic reality— this is, complex structure of materials and nature in addition to the human mind full of deviations and adherence to beliefs. On such critical notion, it must be asked: How language shapes thought and the thought itself shapes the human mind into believing something unbelievable? A parallel then exist. From the partial accounts of historians between the case of Socrates and Athenian Government, if Athenian Government were able to shape the social thought and values of the people residing in Athens, while Socrates were able to shape of the few, then, reality is distorted into a institutional or governmental adherence and distributing something as "facts," meanwhile the opposition (Socrates) also provides a set of "facts"; then, if facts can be contaminated and distorted in accordance to one's belief, would it not corrupt any forms of knowledge since two "facts" exists, yet neither side never settle a treatise into making a one account of facts? Likewise, in contemporary era, this is similar to religion and science; or to science and government.

Within the engagement, God cannot be "God" without the assignment of an etymologists. Another, do we know that such etymologist believe in such "God" knowing they created it? If the case is so, it proves to us that this is a wide scale "cult" or a blind-mass experiment.

Or, in some fundamental sense, if the word "God" did not exist nor formed, what do we then think of politics and, specially, to fictitious myth?